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Abstract
After learning about facts or outcomes of events, people overestimate in hindsight what they knew in foresight. Prior research has
shown that this hindsight bias is more pronounced in older than in younger adults. However, this robust finding is based primarily
on a specific paradigm that requires generating and recalling numerical judgments to general knowledge questions that deal with
emotionally neutral content. As older and younger adults tend to process positive and negative information differently, theymight
also show differences in hindsight bias after positive and negative outcomes. Furthermore, hindsight bias can manifest itself as a
bias in memory for prior given judgments, but also as retrospective impressions of inevitability and foreseeability. Currently,
there is no research on age differences in all three manifestations of hindsight bias. In this study, younger (N = 46, 18–30 years)
and older adults (N = 45, 64–90 years) listened to everyday-life scenarios that ended positively or negatively, recalled the
expectation they previously held about the outcome (to measure the memory component of hindsight bias), and rated each
outcome’s foreseeability and inevitability. Compared with younger adults, older adults recalled their prior expectations as closer
to the actual outcomes (i.e., they showed a larger memory component of hindsight bias), and this age difference was more
pronounced for negative than for positive outcomes. Inevitability and foreseeability impressions, however, did not differ between
the age groups. Thus, there are age differences in hindsight bias after positive and negative outcomes, but only with regard to
memory for prior judgments.
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Introduction
When we look back on what we knew previously, we are
often biased by what we know now. In hindsight, we think
that we “knew it all along” (Wood, 1978), we assign higher a
priori probabilities to facts or outcomes (Fischhoff, 1975), and
we misremember our prior predictions as closer to facts or
actual outcomes (e.g., Erdfelder & Buchner, 1998). This cog-
nitive illusion has been termed hindsight bias (for reviews, see
Blank et al., 2007; Roese & Vohs, 2012) and is pervasive in a
variety of everyday situations, such as in political elections,
medical diagnoses, or scientific experiments (e.g., Arkes et al.,
1981; Blank et al., 2003; Slovic & Fischhoff, 1977). It is also
robust across a wide range of materials and different tasks
(Pohl, 2007).
In one of the most common types of task to study hindsight
bias, the memory paradigm, participants are first asked to
provide judgments; for example, numerical judgments to a
set of difficult knowledge questions (e.g., How many letters
does the Arabic alphabet contain?). They then receive the
correct answer for some or all of the questions (e.g., The
Arabic alphabet contains 28 letters). Finally, they are asked
to recall their own original judgments. Hindsight bias occurs
when recalled judgments are shifted toward presented correct
answers. We will refer to the bias measured in the memory
paradigm as the memory component of hindsight bias.1
Research has repeatedly demonstrated that in such
numerical-estimation tasks, older adults are more prone to
the described memory distortion (e.g., Bayen et al., 2006;
1 It is important to clarify that with the term memory component of hindsight
bias, we refer to the hindsight bias that is measured in the memory paradigm.
The term does not refer to possible processes that underlie this bias (which
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Bernstein et al., 2011; Coolin et al., 2015; Groß & Bayen,
2015). In a recent meta-analysis, Groß and Pachur (2019)
found that older adults show worse memory for their own
original judgments than young adults do, and—as a
consequence—must reconstruct their judgments more often.
In this reconstruction, older adults are more prone to be biased
by the correct answer than younger adults are. This could be
due to older adults’ worse memory for their own original
judgments (e.g., Groß & Bayen, 2015), and/or to their larger
difficulties in inhibiting the correct answer in the reconstruc-
tion of original judgments (e.g., Coolin et al., 2015).
In this study, we aimed at extending previous findings on
age differences in hindsight bias with regard to two important
aspects. Our first main aim was to investigate age differences
in hindsight bias in a self-relevant domain with positive and
negative outcomes. Our second main aim was to expand our
understanding of age differences in hindsight bias by investi-
gating manifestations other than memory distortions—name-
ly, retrospective impressions of foreseeability and inevitabili-
ty. In the following, we will explain in more detail the impor-
tance of these two extensions in research on age differences in
hindsight bias.
Hindsight bias for positive and negative outcomes
The finding that older adults are more prone to hindsight
bias than younger adults are is based primarily on studies
that investigated memory for numerical judgments in
general-knowledge tasks (summarized in Groß & Pachur,
2019).2 However, hindsight bias not only occurs after
learning facts and figures that are emotionally neutral, but
also after emotionally significant outcomes of personal rel-
evance, such as losing a job, missing a sale, or hearing
from an old friend (Blank & Peters, 2010; Louie, 1999;
Mark & Mellor, 1991; Pezzo & Beckstead, 2008;
Tykocinski, 2001). For example, in one of the first studies
involving emotionally relevant outcomes, Mark and Mellor
(1991) found hindsight bias to be reduced in laid-off
manufacturing workers, for whom the layoff was negative,
compared with retained workers or community members,
for whom the layoff was less consequential. Subsequent
studies have found similar decreases in hindsight bias after
negative outcomes (Groß et al., 2017; Nestler et al., 2010),
but other studies have also found increases in hindsight
bias after negative, self-relevant outcomes (e.g.,
Tykocinski, 2001; Wann et al., 2008). Thus, while the va-
lence of the outcome does affect hindsight bias, this effect
is not uniform. As we will explain in more detail in the
next section, among the key variables that moderate the
effect of outcome valence on hindsight bias in self-
relevant domains are the amount of personal controllability
of the (positive or negative) outcome (Blank & Peters,
2010), and the hindsight-bias manifestation (component)
under consideration (Blank et al., 2008).
To the best of our knowledge, no study has examined age
differences in hindsight bias for such event outcomes. There is
reason to believe that positive and negative outcomes—that is,
outcomes that can be emotionally significant—have a special
status in older adults’ cognitive processing. It is thought that
older adults shift their goals towards emotional functioning
and meaningfulness as their future time perspective becomes
less expanded (Carstensen, 2006). In fact, older adults report
higher levels of emotional well-being than younger adults
(e.g., Carstensen et al., 2011; Kunzmann et al., 2017;
Mroczek & Spiro, 2005). Prominent theories of emotional
aging postulate that these age-related differences in affective
experience can be linked to age-related differences in cogni-
tion. Specifically, in comparison with young adults, older
adults show a preference for positive over negative material
in information processing, including memory (Mather &
Carstensen, 2005; Reed et al., 2014). For example, compared
with younger adults, older adults tend to recall fewer negative
than positive images (Charles et al., 2003), and they recall
more positive and less negative affect than do younger adults
(Levine & Bluck, 1997; Ready et al., 2007). Age-related dif-
ferences in cognition may thus be in service of emotion regu-
lation (for a review, see Isaacowitz & Blanchard-Fields,
2012). We assume that this may also show in the processing
of positive and negative outcome information in hindsight
judgments. Therefore, a first main aim of the current study
was to investigate age differences in hindsight bias after pos-
itive and negative outcomes.
Multiple components of hindsight bias
As outlined above, hindsight bias can manifest itself as biased
recall of prior given judgments, once the facts or outcomes are
known, typically referred to as the memory component of
hindsight bias. However, knowing about facts or outcomes
of events also affects retrospective judgments of inevitability
(“It was bound to happen”; Fischhoff, 1975), and retrospec-
tive judgments of foreseeability (“I knew it all along”;
Fischhoff, 1977). To accommodate the different manifesta-
tions of hindsight bias, Blank et al. (2008; see also Roese &
Vohs, 2012) proposed a multiple-components view on hind-
sight bias. According to this view, the three components—the
memory component of hindsight bias, inevitability impres-
sions, and foreseeability impressions—are independent man-
ifestations of hindsight bias that can occur individually or in
combination in reference to an event’s outcome, depending on
the requirements of the task. That is, they can be empirically
dissociated (e.g., Nestler et al., 2010).
2 The only exception we are aware of is the study by Bernstein et al. (2011),
who found older adults to be more prone to hindsight bias than young adults
are in a task that required visual identification of (emotionally neutral) objects.
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The memory component of hindsight bias is mainly
governed by variables that affect memory in general, such
as the depth of encoding, the length of the retention inter-
val, and the amount of interference (Erdfelder et al., 2007;
Groß & Bayen, 2015; Hell et al., 1988). It has been sug-
gested that this memory component of hindsight bias is a
by-product of an adaptive knowledge-updating process
(Hoffrage et al., 2000).
Inevitability impressions are a second component of hind-
sight bias. They occur when one retrospectively thinks “it had
to happen,” or when—with outcome knowledge; that is, in
hindsight—people assign higher probabilities to outcomes
than without outcome knowledge (i.e., in foresight; e.g.,
Fischhoff, 1975). For example, in a study by Slovic and
Fischhoff (1977), participants were asked to rate the probabil-
ities of outcomes of scientific studies (e.g., a female rat show-
ing maternal behavior after having been injected with blood
from a mother rat). Participants who had been informed about
an alleged true outcome (hindsight group) assigned higher
probabilities to these outcomes (and the outcomes’ replicabil-
ity), compared with participants who had not been informed
about a true outcome (foresight group). Inevitability impres-
sions follow from a person’s causal model; therefore, they are
stronger when meaningful explanations for an outcome are
available, compared with when no explanations are available
(Nestler et al., 2010).
Foreseeability impressions are the third component of
hindsight bias and refer to the metacognitive belief that one
was able to foresee or predict the occurrence of the outcome
(“knew-it-all-along” effect). In contrast to inevitability im-
pressions, which refer to the probability of the situation or
outcome itself (i.e.,Was the outcome inevitable?), foreseeabil-
ity impressions are judgments about one’s thinking about the
outcome (i.e., Did I foresee the outcome?). For example, par-
ticipants in a study by Hastie et al. (1999) reviewed informa-
tion about a route of hazardous train tracks. Participants who
had learned about the occurrence of a severe accident (hind-
sight group) indicated that they had foreseen the accident to a
greater extent than did those who had not learned about the
accident (foresight group). Foreseeability impressions are
counter to feelings of surprise (Nestler et al., 2010).
Inevitability impressions and foreseeability impressions are
not only different in nature, but they might also serve different
psychological functions. Specifically, it has been suggested
that individuals may adjust their impressions of inevitability
or foreseeability of event outcomes in retrospect in order to
regulate negative affect (e.g., Blank et al., 2008; Pezzo &
Pezzo, 2007). For example, a person could increase the per-
ceived inevitability of a negative outcome (“It was bound to
happen anyway”) in order to cope with disappointment.
Tykocinski (2001) found that participants who experienced a
disappointing outcome (e.g., the failure to secure an attractive
deal) retrospectively showed increased impressions of
inevitability of the outcome. Such inevitability increases
should be helpful primarily when the outcome had been out
of one’s personal control (Blank & Peters, 2010).
To avoid regret or self-blame, a person may decrease the
perceived foreseeability of a negative event outcome (“I didn’t
see it coming”; Louie, 1999). Such unforeseeability impres-
sions can reduce self-blame for outcomes that had been, at
least partly, under the person’s control (Blank & Peters,
2010) and are typically found in contexts with emotional rel-
evance (e.g., Groß et al., 2017; Mark & Mellor, 1991; Nestler
et al., 2010). For example, Nestler et al. (2010) found that
participants who had experienced a (fictitious) financial loss
due to a risky stock purchase rated their loss as less foresee-
able in hindsight than in foresight.
Studies that attempted to assess such psychological func-
tions of inevitability and foreseeability impressions, for in-
stance, by examining associations between the hindsight com-
ponents and affect, have mainly relied on hypothetical scenar-
ios. The results are mixed and inconclusive (e.g., Blank &
Peters, 2010; Groß et al., 2017; Tykocinski & Steinberg,
2005). This may indicate that a function of hindsight bias
may not be present under all circumstances (discussed by
Nestler et al., 2010) or that such a function may be difficult
to tap (discussed by Groß et al., 2017).
In sum, it is currently unknown whether age differences in
hindsight bias are restricted to the memory component, or
whether age differences also emerge for inevitability and fore-
seeability impressions. A psychological function might be as-
sociated with these components of hindsight bias, although
empirical evidence is inconclusive. Without knowledge of
possible age differences in all three components of hindsight
bias, the picture of hindsight bias in older age is incomplete.
Therefore, the second main aim of our current study was to fill
a research gap by investigating possible age differences in all
three components of hindsight bias.
The present study
To address our two main aims, we examined different mani-
festations of hindsight bias after positive and negative out-
comes of everyday-life scenarios. Healthy older and younger
adults listened (via headphones) to a series of everyday-life
scenarios that had a positive or a negative outcome. To inves-
tigate hindsight bias (i.e., a bias due to outcome knowledge),
we had participants rate each hindsight-bias component from
both a pre- and a postoutcome perspective.
Apart from our two main aims, we explored two additional
questions. First, we included cognitive (recall ability) and mo-
tivational (future time perspective, current mood) variables to
explore potential associations of these variables with hindsight
bias and age differences therein. Second, we explored the
relationship of hindsight bias (and age-differences therein)
with affective reactions to gauge potential age differences in
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the assumed psychological functions. To this end, we had
older and younger adults rate the affective reaction they
thought they would experience after the imagined positive
and negative outcomes.
With regard to our first main aim, we expected a stronger
memory component of hindsight bias in older compared with
younger adults (Groß & Pachur, 2019). In line with previous
findings on age differences in emotional information process-
ing (Charles et al., 2003), we expected older adults to (a) hold
more positive expectations about the outcomes than younger
adults, and (b) recall more scenarios that ended positively
rather than negatively, compared with younger adults. With
regard to age differences in the memory component of hind-
sight bias for negative versus positive outcomes, our expecta-
tions were less clear-cut. Assuming that memory for expecta-
tions followed by negative (vs. positive) outcomes would be
worse in older than in younger adults due to an age-related
positivity effect in recall, older adults’ hindsight bias should
be more pronounced for negative (vs. positive) outcomes, be-
cause hindsight bias increases as memory for the original
judgment decreases (Groß & Bayen, 2015). However, prior
research has also found lower emotional well-being, as indi-
cated by higher levels of depressive symptoms, to be associ-
ated with stronger memory hindsight bias for negative (vs.
positive) outcomes (Groß et al., 2017). Thus, older adults,
whose emotional well-being is superior, might show less pro-
nounced memory hindsight bias for negative outcomes than
younger adults. Therefore, age differences in the memory
component of hindsight bias for negative versus positive out-
comes may depend on the relative influence of cognitive
(recall) versus emotional-motivational factors in remembering
the initial expectation.
If foreseeability and inevitability impressions have psycho-
logical (self-regulation) functions that unfold in reaction to the
scenarios, then we should observe pre-to-post outcome
increases in inevitability and/or decreases in foreseeability
following negative outcomes, whereas for positive outcomes,
pre- to postoutcome shifts should be less pronounced or in the
opposite direction. This pattern should be more pronounced in
older than in younger adults if hindsight bias has a psycholog-
ical function relevant to emotional well-being, which is supe-
rior in older adults.
Method
Participants
The study was approved by the local Ethics Committee. All
participants were native speakers of German. The older adults
were community residents of the Düsseldorf area and received
monetary compensation. They were recruited via newspaper
advertisement or personal contact (e.g., at recreational facili-
ties and events for senior citizens). The younger adults were
students at Heinrich-Heine-Universität Düsseldorf and re-
ceived course credit or monetary compensation. They were
recruited via social-media platforms and flyers posted on
campus.
We recruited participants above the age of 60 (older adults)
or below the age of 31 (younger adults). To rule out effects of
depressive symptoms on our hindsight measures, we excluded
participants with moderate or severe depressive symptoms
(i.e., with Beck Depression Inventory, 2nd ed. [BDI-II] scores
> 19; Beck et al., 1996). We excluded participants currently
under the influence of drugs and those who had consumed
more than four alcoholic drinks within 24 hours prior to par-
ticipating. We further excluded participants with health prob-
lems possibly affecting attention and memory (i.e., current
neurological or psychiatric illness, unregulated high blood
pressure, drug or alcohol abuse, use of sleep-inducing drugs
or sedatives, history of stroke, heart attack, brain trauma, brain
tumor, emphysema, chemotherapy, and alcohol or drug
dependency).
Forty-seven younger and 45 older adults who fulfilled in-
clusion criteria participated. This sample size is in line with
earlier research on the topic (see Groß & Pachur, 2019,
Table 2, for an overview). We excluded one younger partici-
pant for not following the instructions. Table 1 shows partic-
ipant characteristics.
Materials and measures
Scenario descriptionsWe used 16 scenario descriptions in the
German language (available in the Open Science Framework
at https://osf.io/qvhnu/). The scenarios described situations
related to health, family, leisure, romance, household, and
travel. We used scenarios with outcomes that we considered
neither completely uncontrollable nor completely controllable
because outcome controllability is a moderator of hindsight
bias (Blank & Peters, 2010) that we wanted to control. We
adopted 11 scenarios from a previous study with young adults
established as neither completely (un-)controllable (for
details, see Groß et al., 2017). In addition, we created five
new scenarios, for which we assumed neither complete (un-)
controllability, and that were similar to the other scenarios in
both structure and content domains, such that all scenarios
could plausibly take place in the everyday life of both younger
and older adults.
We created two descriptions of each scenario, one with a
positive outcome and one with a negative outcome. An exam-
ple of a scenario description (translated from German) is in
Appendix 1. (An English translation of all scenarios can be
found at: https://osf.io/qvhnu/). In a separate online rating
study, the positive and the negative scenario outcomes were
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rated as comparably likely to occur and comparably realistic
(details on this study and its results can be found in the
Supplemental Materials).
We divided the 16 scenarios into two subsets of eight sce-
narios each (Subsets 1 and 2), with similar topics in each
subset. For 21 younger and 23 older participants, Subset 1
was presented with a positive and Subset 2 was presented with
a negative outcome. For 25 younger and 22 older participants
the subset-to-outcome assignment was reversed.
Measures at the scenario level For each scenario, participants
provided pre- and postoutcome ratings of imaginability, fore-
seeability, inevitability, outcome expectation, and affect. All
items had been established in previous research (Blank et al.,
2008; Blank & Peters, 2010; Groß et al., 2017). Specifically,
before learning about the outcome, participants rated the
imaginability of the scenario (“I can clearly imagine myself
in the described situation”), the foreseeability of the outcome
(“I know how the situation will turn out,” “It is difficult to
predict how the situation will turn out” [reverse coded]), and
the inevitability of the outcome (“Under the given circum-
stances the outcome of the situation is essentially determined,”
“Because of the many factors that could influence the outcome
of the situation, the outcome is still open” [reverse coded]).
For each of these items, participants rated their degree of ap-
proval on a continuous scale with the anchors I fully disagree
and I fully agree at the extremes; the rating was automatically
translated to a number between 0 and 100. As a baseline for
our measure of the memory component of hindsight bias,
participants rated their expectation about the outcome (“The
situation will turn out…”) on a continuous scale ranging from
0 (negative) to 100 (positive).
After learning about the outcome, participants again rated
its foreseeability and inevitability. For this postoutcome mea-
surement of hindsight cognitions, we used the pre-outcome
items and worded them in the past tense (e.g., “I knew how
the situation would turn out”). To measure the memory com-
ponent of hindsight bias, participants recalled their prior ex-
pectation (“I assumed that the situation would turn out
[negative–positive from 0 to 100]”). Finally, participants rated
three items measuring affect (“If I were in the described situ-
ation, I’d feel happy/angry/sad”) on a continuous scale rang-
ing from 0 (I fully disagree) to 100 (I fully agree).
Measures at the participant level We measured mood, future
time perspective, verbal ability, recall ability, education, and
level of depression at the participant level. We generated three
items to measure mood: “At the moment, my mood is [very
bad–very good],” “At the moment, my mood is [depressed–
cheerful],” and “At the moment, I feel [sad–happy].”
Participants provided ratings on a continuous scale, which
we translated into values between 0 (maximum negative
mood) to 100 (maximum positive mood).Wemeasured future
time perspective (FTP) with the German 10-item version of
the Future Time Perspective Scale (Carstensen & Lang, 1996)
by calculating an average FTP score per participant. We mea-
sured verbal ability with the Mehrfachwahl-Wortschatz-
Intelligenztest [Multiple-choice vocabulary intelligence test]
(MWT-B; Lehrl, 1999). We measured recall ability by asking
participants to write down the gist of as many scenarios as
they were able to remember (e.g., “dentist appointment,”
“cake baking for birthday party”). Answers were coded as
“recalled” or “not recalled” by two independent raters, with
a high level of agreement (κ = 0.94; disagreement was re-
solved by the first author based on explanatory comments by
the two raters). We measured level of depression with the
German version of the BDI-II (Hautzinger et al., 2006), and
education as self-reported years of formal schooling (i.e., high
school, vocational school, college, university).
Procedure
Participants were tested individually or in groups of up to four
in a university laboratory. After giving informed consent, they
completed brief visual and auditory tests and rated their cur-
rent mood. Via headphones, participants then first listened to
all 16 scenario descriptions without the outcomes in random-
ized order. They were asked to imagine themselves in the
situations as well as they could. They were encouraged to
close their eyes and imagine additional details, such as sounds
Table 1 Participant characteristics
Younger adults (N = 46) Older adults (N = 45)
Age in years M (SD) 21.9 (3.0) 73.3 (5.8) p < .05
range 18–30 64–90
Gender female/male n = 31/15 n = 29/16
Education M (SD) 15.1 (2.0) 13.7 (3.4) p < .05
Verbal ability M (SD) 28.1 (3.8) 32.9 (2.2) p < .05
Note. We measured education as total years in high school, vocational school, college, and university. Verbal ability scores were test scores on the 37-
point Mehrfach-Wortschatz-Intelligenztest (MWT-B; Lehrl, 1999)
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and smells. After each scenario, they rated its (preoutcome)
imaginability, foreseeability and inevitability, and outcome
expectation.
After providing pre-outcome ratings for each scenario,
participants again listened to all 16 scenario descriptions
in the same randomized order; this time, the positive or
negative outcomes were included. Again, participants
were asked to imagine themselves in the situations.
After each scenario, participants completed (post-
outcome) measures of foreseeability and inevitability,
recalled their preoutcome expectation (for a measure of
the memory component of hindsight bias), and provided
affect ratings. The retention interval for each scenario was
between 10 and 15 minutes, depending on the time par-
ticipants took for their ratings. Next, participants filled out
the FTP scale, wrote down as many scenarios as they
were able to recall (without time limit), and completed
the BDI-II, the MWT-B, and a demographics-and-health
questionnaire. Finally, participants were debriefed and
compensated.
Results
The data are available in the Open Science Framework
(https://osf.io/qvhnu/). We first report preliminary
analyses: preoutcome scenario ratings, scenario recall,
mood, and FTP for the two age groups. We then report
our main results on age differences in the three
components of hindsight bias—foreseeability, inevi-
tability, and the memory component of hindsight
bias—as a function of scenario outcome valence. We
finally report additional results regarding associations of
these effects with cognitive and motivational variables,
and how affective reactions to the outcomes were related
to age and hindsight bias.
Unless noted otherwise, we performed mixed-effect regres-
sion analyses in which we accounted for variability between
participants and scenarios by including by-participant and by-
scenario random intercepts and random slopes (Barr et al.,
2013). We report fixed-effects regression coefficients along
with their respective p values. We implemented all mixed-
effect regressions in R using lme4 (Bates et al., 2015), and
we obtained p values using lmerTest (Kuznetsova et al.,
2017). We set α at .05.
Preliminary analyses
Imaginability ratings were higher for older (M = 89.0, SD =
10.4) than for younger adults (M = 77.3, SD = 14.9), b =
11.70, p < .001. For the foreseeability and inevitability com-
ponents, we averaged the two items for each component and
time of measurement to a composite score for each participant
and scenario.3 Preoutcome foreseeability ratings did not differ
between younger (M = 61.3; SD = 9.8) and older adults (M =
59.6, SD = 14.6), p = .118. The same held true for inevitability
ratings (younger:M = 51.1, SD = 13.1; older:M = 52.8, SD =
15.5), p = .569. Expectations about the outcomes were rather
positive than negative (M = 69.1, SD = 13.0), p < .001. Older
adults held more positive expectations (M = 75.6, SD = 13.5)
than younger adults (M = 62.8, SD = 8.8), p < .001.
Mean recall was 11.1 of the 16 scenarios (69.3%). Recall
was lower in older (M = 10.4, SD = 2.4) than in younger adults
(M = 11.8, SD = 2.1), b = −0.47, p = .009, but there was
neither a main effect of valence of the scenario outcome on
recall, b = 0.30, p = .161, nor an interaction of age group and
valence, b = −0.30, p = .278 (descriptive statistics are reported
in Table 2). Mood was better in older (M = 78.3, SD = 19.5)
than in younger adults (M = 60.4, SD = 14.8), b = 17.80, p <
.001. As indicated by average FTP scores, older adults per-
ceived their future as less expanded (M = 3.6, SD = 1.1) than
younger adults (M = 5.2, SD = 0.8), t(89) = 7.7, p < .001.
Main results
Overall hindsight bias To measure hindsight bias in the fore-
seeability and inevitability components, we subtracted each
pre-outcome rating from the corresponding postoutcome rat-
ing such that a positive value indicates higher foreseeability
and inevitability after learning the outcome (i.e., hindsight
bias; see also Blank & Nestler, 2006; Nestler et al., 2010;
Nestler et al., 2008). To measure the memory-bias component
of hindsight bias, we subtracted each preoutcome expectation
from the corresponding recalled (post-)outcome expectation
and coded these differences such that positive values always
indicate a shift in recall towards the presented (positive or
negative) outcome.
We observed reversed hindsight bias for both foreseeabil-
ity (b = −12.6, p < .001) and inevitability (b = −8.5, p < .001),
indicating that across age groups and outcomes, ratings of
foreseeability and inevitability decreased from the pre-
outcome to the postoutcome perspective. We observed a sig-
nificant hindsight bias for the memory component, b = 7.2, p <
.001, indicating that across age groups and outcomes, partic-
ipants’ (postoutcome) recall of their expectations shifted to-
ward the presented outcome, compared with their initial
(preoutcome) expectations.
Effects of age group and outcome valence To investigate
effects of age and outcome valence on hindsight bias, we
predicted the hindsight-bias components (foreseeability, inev-
itability, and memory) from age group, outcome valence, and
their interaction (fixed effects). To control for age differences
3 Mean Cronbach’s α for foreseeability items was 0.68 (pre) and 0.67 (post),
and for inevitability items 0.68 (pre) and 0.74 (post).
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in verbal ability, education, and imaginability, we included
these variables as fixed-effect covariates.4 Hindsight bias as
a function of age group and outcome valence is shown in Fig.
1.
For the foreseeability component of hindsight bias, analy-
ses revealed a main effect of outcome valence, b = 10.4, p =
.029—that is, negative outcomes were associated with a stron-
ger decrease in foreseeability (reversed hindsight bias) than
positive outcomes. There was neither an effect of age group,
b = −0.4, p = .936, nor an interaction of age group and out-
come valence, b = 6.9, p = .127, indicating that the foresee-
ability component of hindsight bias was similar in both age
groups.
For the inevitability component of hindsight bias, analyses
revealed an effect of outcome valence, b = 8.3, p = .049—that
is, negative outcomeswere associatedwith a stronger decrease
in inevitability than positive outcomes. Again, there was nei-
ther an effect of age group, b = 0.1, p = .988, nor an interaction
of age group and outcome valence, b = 1.5, p = .701, indicat-
ing that the inevitability component of hindsight bias was
similar in both age groups.5
For the memory component of hindsight bias, analyses
revealed a main effect of age group, b = 14.6, p < .001, indi-
cating a stronger hindsight bias in older than in younger
adults. There was no effect of outcome valence, b = −3.7, p
= .198, but there was an interaction of age group and outcome
valence, b = −9.2, p = .022. Decomposition of the interaction
revealed that in older adults, outcome valence affected
hindsight bias, b = −13.3, p < .001, with stronger bias for
negative outcomes than for positive outcomes. In younger
adults, hindsight bias did not differ between negative and pos-
itive outcomes, b = −3.6, p = .081.6
Additional results
Cognitive and motivational influences In the next step, we
investigated whether including cognitive (i.e., recall ability)
andmotivational (i.e., mood7 and FTP) predictors affected age
differences in the three hindsight-bias components. That is, as
in the first set of analyses, we predicted the hindsight-bias
component from age group, outcome valence, and their inter-
action (fixed effects), with verbal ability, education, and
imaginability as fixed-effect covariates. In addition, we in-
cluded recall ability, mood, and FTP as fixed-effect predictors.
For the foreseeability and inevitability components, respec-
tively, the result pattern remained the same—that is, outcome
valence was the only significant predictor (b = 10.4, p = .029
and b = 8.3, p = .049, respectively). Neither recall ability, nor
mood, nor FTP affected the two hindsight-bias components
(all ps > .458).
For the memory component of hindsight bias, we conduct-
ed separate analyses for younger and older adults, because the
effect of outcome valence on the memory component of hind-
sight bias differed across the two age groups. For younger
adults, analyses revealed no significant effects (all ps >
.073). For older adults, analyses again revealed a significant
main effect of outcome valence, b = −13.3, p = .005, indicat-
ing that hindsight bias was stronger for negative than for pos-
itive outcomes. In addition, mood and recall ability (but not
FTP) were significant predictors: Older adults’ hindsight bias
was stronger with better mood, b = 0.2, p = .007, and stronger
with lower recall ability, b = −2.5, p < .001.
Table 2 Descriptive statistics for rated affect and number of recalled scenarios
Younger adults Older adults
M SD M SD
Affect rating a
(0–100)
Joy 88.0 (11.1) 84.1 (11.5)
Anger 73.1 (13.0) 65.4 (20.3)
Sadness 64.6 (17.0) 60.9 (22.3)
Number of recalled scenarios (0–8) Positive 6.2 (1.3) 5.0 (1.7)
Negative 5.9 (1.2) 5.1 (1.6)
Note. a Presented are group means for positive outcomes only (joy), or negative outcomes only (anger, sadness)
4 Education affected inevitability and memory hindsight-bias measures such
that fewer years of educationwere associatedwith stronger hindsight bias. Yet,
in all analyses, predictor effects were identical both with and without inclusion
of education as a covariate. In none of the analyseswas there an effect of verbal
ability or imaginability.
5 An anonymous reviewer pointed out that the outcome is clearly specified
when participants provide postoutcome foreseeability and inevitability ratings,
but vague when they provide preoutcome ratings. To rule out that this might be
problematic for the interpretation of the pre-to-post outcome difference mea-
sures, we also performed analyses on foreseeability and inevitability with
postoutcome ratings only. For both components, we observed the identical
result patterns; that is, we found the same effects of valence, and no interaction
of age group and valence.
6 Correlations between the hindsight-bias components are reported in the
Supplemental Materials.
7 The three mood items were averaged into a composite score for each partic-
ipant (mean Cronbach’s α = .93).
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Rated affective reactions Finally, to explore a potential rela-
tionship between hindsight bias and affect, we examined the
affective reactions that participants rated after positive and
negative scenario outcomes (sadness, joy, and anger), and
predicted each affective reaction from age group and
hindsight-bias component.8 Again, we entered verbal ability,
education, and imaginability as covariates. Affective reactions
did not differ between the age groups (all ps > .071;
descriptive statistics are in Table 2). Except for joy, which
was positively related to the memory component of hindsight
bias after positive outcomes, b = 0.1, p < .001, affective reac-
tions were unrelated to hindsight bias (all ps > .058).
Discussion
This study had two main aims. First, we wanted to investigate
age differences in hindsight bias after naturalistic self-relevant
positive and negative outcomes. Second, this is the first study
to compare all three components of hindsight bias in younger
and older adults.
Age differences in hindsight bias for positive and
negative outcomes
In our study, older adults showed stronger overall memory
component of hindsight bias than younger adults, replicating
prior research on age differences in the memory component
of hindsight bias (as summarized by Groß & Pachur, 2019).
This is the first study to show that stronger hindsight bias in
older adults does not only arise for numerical (or visual)
judgments but extends to more self-relevant material.
In the study reported here—as in the studies with numerical
judgments—older adults may have been more susceptible to a
hindsight bias in thememory component because of their poorer
memory for their prior judgments (e.g., Groß & Bayen, 2015;
Groß & Pachur, 2019). Note that the design of our study did not
allow us to test this hypothesis directly because it did not allow
separate measurement of a) recollection of prior expectations
from memory and b) measurement of biased reconstruction of
prior expectations (for a measurement model that disentangles
these processes for numerical judgments, see Erdfelder &
Buchner, 1998). However, we found a negative relationship of
older adults’ memory for the gist of the presented scenarios (an
indicator of general recall ability) with the memory component
of hindsight bias. This concurs with earlier reports that age-
related differences in episodic memory predicted age-related
differences in hindsight bias (Coolin et al., 2015; Groß &
Bayen, 2015).
Further, mood was a predictor of the memory component
of hindsight bias in older adults (independent of the effect of
recall ability). Specifically, better mood was associated with a
stronger bias. This finding is consistent with accounts that
posit a reliance on heuristic processing (here, anchoring on
the actual outcome) in a positive mood (e.g., Huntsinger
et al., 2014), and it is also consistent with prior research on
the effects of mood on hindsight bias (Groß & Bayen, 2017;
Nestler et al., 2010). In younger adults, the memory
Fig. 1 Hindsight bias as a function of age group and outcome valence
(negative vs. positive). The bars show mean hindsight-bias scores across
participants and scenarios; error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals.
For all three components, hindsight bias was calculated as the difference
between post-outcome ratings and preoutcome ratings. For the memory
component, participants provided ratings on a scale from 0 (negative) to
100 (positive); therefore, we recoded the post-to-pre-outcome differences
such that positive bias scores always represent a shift towards the present-
ed (positive or negative) outcome
8 We centered each hindsight-bias measure by subtracting the hindsight-bias
scenario mean from each individual hindsight-bias score.
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component of hindsight bias was affected neither bymood nor
by recall ability, suggesting that it either depends on other
factors or that its variability was too small to be explained
by these variables (see Coolin et al., 2015, for a similar
result pattern and discussion).
Our study revealed stronger memory component of hind-
sight bias for negative than for positive outcomes in older, but
not younger adults. At first glance, this result may appear to
contradict theories that emphasize a positivity bias in older
adults’ information processing (Mather & Carstensen, 2005).
However, suppose worse memory for one’s prior judgments
renders an individual more susceptible to a bias due to out-
come knowledge (Groß & Bayen, 2015). In this case, older
adults’ stronger memory component of hindsight bias for neg-
ative outcomesmight indicate that they had worsememory for
those outcome expectations that resulted in a negative ending
(leading to stronger bias) than those that resulted in a positive
ending (leading to a smaller bias). Such a pattern would be in
line with the common finding of better memory for positive
over negative information in older adults (Charles et al.,
2003). However, this account would assume that the bias
measured in the memory paradigm was indeed a recollection
bias (i.e., outcome knowledge biased the recollection of prior
judgments). As explained above, our paradigm did not allow
for separate measurements of recollection and reconstruction
of one’s prior judgment. Therefore, we do not know if the age-
related stronger bias toward negative outcomes was due to
biased recollection, biased reconstruction, or other sources.
Our measure of recall ability—recall of the gist of the
scenarios—showed that there was no age difference in the
number of positive versus negative outcomes recalled. Thus,
we cannot attribute our finding of age-related differences in
the memory component of hindsight bias to an age-related
processing bias.
The absence of an age-related processing bias in our study
might appear inconsistent with meta-analytic evidence for a
positivity effect reported by Reed et al. (2014). However, the
authors found that positivity effects were mitigated or absent,
when the instructions constrained information processing
(e.g., by having participants provide judgments about the
stimuli at encoding, or by explicitly asking them to remember
information). There were such constraints in our study, which
might explain the absence of preferential processing of posi-
tive information in older adults. In sum, age-related positivity
effects in recall are a possible source of age-related differences
in hindsight bias, but there is no direct evidence for them in
our study. The remaining methodological challenges should
be addressed in future research.
The current results resemble results reported by Groß et al.
(2017), who studied hindsight bias in younger adults with
wide-ranging levels of depressive symptoms. There, a hind-
sight bias in the memory component emerged for negative
outcomes and was absent for positive outcomes. This
difference increased with increasing levels of depressive
symptoms. Thus, descriptively, the older adults’ stronger
hindsight bias for negative than positive outcomes in the cur-
rent study mimics the stronger hindsight bias for negative than
positive outcomes found in younger adults with depressive
symptoms (Groß et al., 2017). However, as we excluded par-
ticipants with depressive symptoms in the present study, we
believe that the two effects—although similar in
appearance—result from different mechanisms. First, older
adults in the current study had positive expectations regarding
the outcomes, whereas individuals with depressive symptoms
in Groß et al. had negative expectations. Second, positive
mood was associated with stronger bias in older adults in the
present study, whereas higher depression levels were associ-
ated with stronger bias in individuals with depressive symp-
toms in Groß et al. Thus, it is likely that different mechanisms
resulted in the same observable phenomenon. For future re-
search, we suggest to include control scenarios without out-
comes, as these can help to disentangle effects due to the
presentation of an outcome from effects that are unrelated to
the presentation of an outcome (e.g., general tendency to recall
judgments more negatively). For the future, it is an important
and challenging endeavor to examine when and how cognitive
and emotional factors influence the occurrence and magnitude
of hindsight bias and other memory distortions.
Age differences in hindsight bias are component
specific
Our study found diverging effects of aging on the separate
components of hindsight bias. While the age groups differed
with regard to how they remembered their prior expectations
about the outcomes, they did not differ with regard to the
subjective foreseeability and inevitability of event outcomes.
That is, older and younger adults showed similar pre-to-post
outcome shifts in judgments of the outcomes’ foreseeability
and inevitability.
For both these components and across age groups and out-
comes, we observed reversed hindsight bias. That is, after
participants had learned the outcomes, they perceived these
as less foreseeable and less inevitable than before. At first
glance, this result may seem inconsistent with the large body
of research demonstrating robust hindsight bias. However,
such reversals of hindsight bias are not uncommon, and prior
research has repeatedly demonstrated impressions of un-
foreseeability, specifically after personally relevant and nega-
tive outcomes (e.g., Blank et al., 2015; Groß et al., 2017;Mark
& Mellor, 1991; Nestler et al., 2010). In line with our predic-
tions, we found the shifts towards unforeseeability to be more
pronounced for negative outcomes, and small or absent for
positive outcomes—a result supportive of a self-protective
function (“I didn’t see that coming!”). Alternatively, rather
than indicating a psychological function, unforeseeability of
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negative outcomes may be a simple reflection of the partici-
pants’ generally optimistic beliefs (Sharot, 2011; Weinstein,
1980), as expressed in their positive expectations.
Our finding of a decrease in inevitability impressions con-
tradicts accounts that propose a coping function of increases
in inevitability after negative outcomes (e.g., Tykocinski,
2001; but see Groß et al., 2017, for a similar finding). Our
finding likely implicates that it was difficult for participants to
find explanations for the outcomes. Causal explanations are a
major driving force behind inevitability impressions (Nestler
et al., 2008). In contrast to other studies that also investigated
foreseeability and inevitability within the same paradigm
(e.g., Blank & Peters, 2010), we did not provide explanations
or additional information that could help make sense of the
outcomes. Finding explanations may have been particularly
difficult for negative outcomes, as suggested by a decrease in
inevitability that was more pronounced for negative than pos-
itive outcomes. Again, rather than indicating a specific psy-
chological function, this finding may simply reflect generally
positive schemata in our healthy participants. Note that this
finding also replicates our prior study, which showed de-
creases in both foreseeability and inevitability in healthy
younger adults for scenarios without additional explanatory
information (Groß et al., 2017).
In sum, the similar decrease in foreseeability and
inevitability—in particular for negative outcomes—is thus
not (entirely) in line with the possibility that these hindsight
impressions can regulate negative affect (i.e., promote coping
and aid self-protection). The most likely explanation is that
our experimental set-up did not cause strong imagined affect
that required regulation. We discuss this point in more detail
below. Instead, the similar shifts in foreseeability and inevita-
bility point toward cognitive explanations (see also Blank
et al., 2008; Blank & Nestler, 2006; Groß et al., 2017).
Specifically, metacognition and causal explanations have
been proposed to underlie the foreseeability and inevitability
components of hindsight bias, respectively (Blank et al.,
2008).
As we found no age difference in foreseeability and inev-
itability impressions, one possible conclusion from our study
could be that underlying processes did not differ between
older and younger adults. However, it is also possible that
age differences in underlying processes result in similar ob-
servable hindsight judgments (for an example, see Bayen
et al., 2006, Experiment 3; and see our discussion below).
Our study was not designed to investigate metacognition
and causal explanations as processes underlying hindsight
judgments; thus, future research should attempt to clarify their
role in hindsight judgments in younger and older adults.
In contrast to our findings on the memory component of
hindsight bias, we found no support for older adults’ differen-
tial processing of positive versus negative outcomes in the
foreseeability and inevitability components of hindsight bias.
How can this finding be explained? For the measurement of
the memory component of hindsight bias, participants are
asked to recall their preoutcome expectations, whereas for
the measurement of foreseeability bias and inevitability bias,
they provide new postoutcome judgments. That is, for the
latter two, there is no demand on episodic memory. Our study
therefore adds to the evidence that age differences in cognitive
factors (specifically, recall ability) are an important driving
force behind age differences in the memory component of
hindsight bias (see also Groß & Bayen, 2015).
There was no effect of future time perspective in any
of our analyses. Age differences in future time perspec-
tive thus cannot explain age differences in hindsight bias
in this study. This finding resonates with research that
questions future time perspective as a key explanatory
construct behind emotional well-being in older adulthood
(e.g., Grühn et al., 2015). Future research should attempt
to pinpoint the conditions under which future time per-
spective is or is not predictive of behavior in experimen-
tal tasks.
Hindsight bias and affective self-regulation: A topic
for future research
Like prior research, the present study did not show a strong
relationship between hindsight bias and affect. Our scenar-
ios were developed to represent the ups and downs of daily
life of older and younger adults, but they were merely
hypothetical. Future research should investigate possible
associations between hindsight bias and affect by relying
on genuine positive and negative experiences. These might
promote the use of hindsight judgments to regulate affect.
In addition, it would be important to clarify the causal
direction between hindsight bias and affect. Specifically,
we found that the memory component of hindsight bias for
positive outcomes was associated with higher levels of joy.
While hindsight bias may lead to increased levels of joy,
joy may also increase the probability of positively biased
recall (e.g., Eich et al., 1994). By manipulating the strength
of hindsight bias, it might be possible to disambiguate this
association in future research.
Conclusions and outlook
In this study, we found age differences in hindsight bias in a
paradigm with positive and negative event outcomes.
Specifically, we found a stronger memory component of hind-
sight bias in older than in younger adults, which was particu-
larly pronounced for negative outcomes. According to our
results, age differences in both cognition and emotion drive
this age difference. Our study provides a comprehensive view
on hindsight bias in older adulthood by showing that age
differences are component specific. We thus extended prior
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research on age differences in hindsight with regard to two
important aspects: the judgment domain and hindsight-bias
components. Among the next steps towards a better under-
standing of this result we propose to investigate the underlying
mechanisms of the memory component of hindsight bias for
outcomes of emotional significance (e.g., biases in recall,
mood), the underlying mechanisms of foreseeability and in-
evitability impressions (e.g., metacognition, causal explana-
tions), and their relative contributions to hindsight bias in
younger and older adults. Additionally, it is important to track
down potential self-regulatory functions of hindsight bias with
appropriate procedures.
Appendix 1
Scenario description with positive and negative outcome
(translated from German)
Imagine that you have been attending a weekly dancing
class for years. You arrive at the hall and change into your
dancing shoes. You say hello to some of your dancing fellows
and chat with them about the past week. Then the class starts.
The training is going well for you. You and your dancing
partner are dancing in step during the whole class. You even
succeed in performing a spin, which you had never before
managed to do. Afterwards, you are very pleased and drive
home in a cheerful mood. (positive outcome)
The training is not going well for you. You seem to lack
concentration, and you are not dancing in step. You even twist
your ankle. Your ankle hurts, and your dancing partner is
annoyed at you. (negative outcome)
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